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The pursuit of a quantitative target for the in￿ ation rate and for the ￿scal balance characterizes
macroeconomic policy in several industrial and emerging market economies. The adoption of these
targets and success in achieving them became, in the case of emerging markets, a necessary condition
for continued access to funds made available by international lenders of last resort. Yet, there has
not been a systematic attempt to evaluate the welfare consequences of such policy mix in this kind
of economic environment. The objective of this paper is to ￿ll in this gap.
Speci￿cally, it makes two contributions. First, using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model that is calibrated to the case of Brazil, this paper provides a second-order-accurate measure
of welfare and calculates the welfare loss incurred in a regime in which there are explicit targets for
both the level of public debt and the consumer price index (CPI) in￿ ation.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on welfare maximizing ￿scal and monetary policy
rules in economies with nominal price rigidities. It shows that the main conclusions of this literature
still hold in a more general economic environment that features an open economy with capital
accumulation and distortionary taxation.
Focusing on policy regimes such that the in￿ ation and the ￿scal target are both attainable, the
main ￿nding is that a strong anti-in￿ ation stance, coupled with strict ￿scal discipline is optimal.
Speci￿cally, low volatility of public debt and in￿ ation around their targets increases welfare. This
result holds even though in￿ ation and government expenditures in emerging markets are more volatile
than in industrial countries - hence despite the fact that a strict pursuit of the in￿ ation and the ￿scal
target will imply more volatile tax and interest rates.
There is a simple intuition behind these results. A strong anti-in￿ ation stance is optimal because,
consistent with previous ￿ndings in the literature, price dispersion due to nominal price rigidities
generates an output loss.1 At the same time, in the model economy studied in this paper, fast ￿scal
adjustments are optimal because they are conducive to lower average tax rates. In other words, low
public debt volatility is associated to a lower intratemporal tax distortion in the stochastic equilibrium
1References are Goodfriend and King (1997) and King and Wolman (1999).
2(at the cost of higher tax rate volatility and increased intertemporal distortion). Depending on the
type of in￿ ation index being targeted, there is even the possibility that the unconditional mean tax
rate will be lower than its non-stochastic stationary level. This channel is present because agents
face non-diversi￿able risks that increase precautionary savings. The increase in savings can boost
capital accumulation, which increases the tax base and makes room for the tax rate reduction. In the
absence of strict ￿scal discipline, part of these savings will fund additional government borrowing,
which crowds out investment. As a consequence, the tax base does not increase and the welfare-
improving reduction of the tax rate is not observed.
These conclusions might suggest that emerging markets are pursuing optimal policies, provided
that the volatility of in￿ ation and public debt around their targets is kept small. This paper shows
that this is not an accurate statement, because typically the in￿ ation target is expressed in terms
of the consumer price in￿ ation. The problem is that CPI targeting does not deliver the maximum
level of welfare. Optimal policy requires that the Monetary Authority chooses to target a domestic
in￿ ation index - one that is not directly a⁄ected by exchange rate ￿ uctuations - as opposed to
targeting the CPI. This conclusion is consistent with previous ￿ndings in the literature of optimal
monetary policy in open economies, in the presence of sticky prices.
The framework employed in this paper provides an additional explanation for why it is optimal to
target a domestic in￿ ation index. For reasons that will become clear later, the positive ￿scal channel
described above - the possibility that the average tax rate will be lower in the stochastic equilibrium
- is only observed with domestic in￿ ation targeting.2
These ￿ndings are reached in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that
features a small open economy with distortionary taxes, capital accumulation and staggered price
setting ￿ la Calvo (1983). The economy has both a tradable and a nontradable goods sector, with
monopolistic competition present in the latter.
Policy instruments are set according to policy rules such as in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000),
2The model predicts that, with domestic in￿ ation targeting, unconditional mean tax rates are lower than their
non-stochastic level. With CPI targeting, the unconditional mean tax rate is higher than its nonstochastic stationary
level. Interestingly, the data shows that, indeed, mean tax rates did increase in emerging markets after the adoption
of CPI targeting.
3Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b), Collard and Dellas (2005) and Kollman (2006). Speci￿cally, the
Monetary Authority announces a target for in￿ ation and sets the nominal interest rate according
to a simple Taylor-type rule. Meanwhile, the Fiscal Authority announces a public debt target and
sets the tax rate according to a rule that links the evolution of the primary surplus to the behavior
of public liabilities. Policy optimality is de￿ned as the speci￿c set of parameters in these rules that
maximize welfare.
The investigation conducted here di⁄ers from previous studies in three fundamental ways. First,
while earlier research on optimal ￿scal and monetary policy rules focuses on closed economies, this
paper studies this issue in the context of an open economy.
Second, previous research on optimal monetary policy in open economies abstracted from the
in￿ uence of ￿scal policy by assuming that Government expenditures could be ￿nanced by non-
distortionary lump sum taxes.3 This paper contributes to this line of research by proposing an
integrated framework for the analysis of optimal monetary and ￿scal policy rules, in an environment
where distortionary income taxes a⁄ect equilibrium allocations.
Finally, a distinctive feature of the model developed in this paper is that is tailored to capture
essential features of emerging market economies, many of which have numeric targets for both the
in￿ ation rate and ￿scal performance. Brazil, an economy that has had primary surplus and in￿ ation
targets since 1999, was chosen as the benchmark case and the model was calibrated in order to match
its features.4
A stylized fact captured by the model is that emerging market economies typically cannot borrow
in their own currency in foreign markets. This type of ￿nancial vulnerability has already been studied
by Mor￿n and Winkelreid (2005), who investigate whether liability dollarization a⁄ects the optimal
implementation of in￿ ation targeting. The role of external borrowing constraints was explored in
depth by Devereux, Lane and Xu (2005) in a sticky-price open economy model with tradables and
nontradables, that investigates welfare maximizing monetary policy rules in emerging markets. In
neither of these models do ￿scal constraints and ￿scal policy play a role in welfare determination.
3References are Svensson (2000), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001), Kollman (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003),
Laxton and Pesenti (2003), Devereux, Lane and Xu (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2005) among others.
4Kopits (2004) provides an overview of ￿scal policy rules in Brazil and in several other economies. Table (1) in the
appendix provides information about ￿scal-in￿ ation targets in a sample of emerging markets.
4The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two lays out the analytical frame-
work. Next, in sections 3 and 4 the calibration procedure is described, along with the dynamic
responses of the economy to shocks. Section 5 discusses welfare results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
Households are endowed with a constant, nonstorable amount of a tradable good Y T every period.
They consume the tradable good
￿
CT￿














where the parameter ￿ captures the degree of openess of the economy. Nontradable goods consump-
tion CH is an aggregate index of di⁄erent varieties of nontradable goods produced by monopolistic
producers, and ￿ is the elasticity of substitution across di⁄erent varieties. The nontradable goods
price index PH

















































The international price of the tradable good PT￿
is constant and, without loss of generality, equal













Households buy tradable and nontradable goods. Part of nontradable good purchases is consumed
and the remaining is invested (i.e., it becomes addition to the capital stock). One period later,
this increase in the capital stock and existent undepreciated capital is rented to nontradable goods
producing ￿rms. Households also decide how many hours to work (Nt) at these ￿rms. Capital income
(Qt) and labor income (Wt) are subject to proportional taxation, at rate ￿t. Households own the
nontradable good producing ￿rms, and receive pro￿ts ￿t:
Households hold two types of bonds. One is a domestic bond issued by the Government, de-
nominated in domestic currency (Bt); and pays, one period later, the risk free gross return (1 + it).
Households also hold internationally traded bonds D
p
t denominated in units of the tradable good.
Assume, without loss of generality, that households are net debtors in the external market, so D
p
t is





: Finally, there is a cash-in-advance constraint (always binding)5, where Mt are nominal
money balances:
Mt = ￿PtCt: (10)
5The cash in advance constraint always binds because in this model the nominal interest rate will always be positive.





subject to the ￿ ow budget constraint,
Mt￿1
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and subject to (5), (6) and (10). They cannot engage in Ponzi schemes.
Denoting UC and UN the partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to its arguments,
and substituting (10) in (12), optimization requires the following ￿rst order conditions to hold (where










































where wt and qt+1 are, respectively, the real wage wt = Wt
Pt and the one period ahead real rental
rate of capital de￿ned as qt+1 =
Qt+1
Pt+1 : The real exchange rate e is part of the capital Euler equation
because the cost and return on capital are a⁄ected by the current and future price of nontradable
goods relative to the price index Pt:
72.2 Upward sloping supply of foreign funds












There is a wedge between the interest rate charged on foreign loans to domestic residents, iF,
and the constant world risk free nominal rate i￿. The wedge will depend on an exogenous variable ￿




; de￿ned as the ratio of the economy￿ s total net foreign liabilities
Dt to the threshold D￿:
Whenever Dt ￿ D￿, the wedge between iF and i￿ increases, depending on the elasticity ￿2. A
debt-elastic interest rate on foreign loans guarantees stationarity of net foreign assets.
The term ￿ is as an exogenous risk premium term, that captures international liquidity and risk
aversion conditions. Unanticipated innovations in the process driving this variable plays the role of
an external shock that hits the economy from time to time. The nonstochastic level ￿ is greater
than zero, capturing the fact that the cost of borrowing for emerging markets is higher than the
international risk free rate.
The risk premium follows an autoregressive process (in log deviations from the steady state ￿):








The assumption that the risk premium is exogenous with respect to domestic fundamentals is also
adopted in other studies that seek to model emerging markets economic dynamics, like in Neumeyer
and Perri (2005). Other authors, like Uribe and Yue (2005) criticize this assumption, showing
empirical evidence that risk spreads depend on domestic variables. The approach followed here falls
somewhere in between these two alternatives, since it is assumed that the country spread can be






There is a continuum of ￿rms in the nontradables sector, (indexed by i, i 2 [0;1]), each producing
output combining capital K and labor N, according to the constant returns to scale technology:
yh




Each ￿rm is a monopolistic producer of a particular variety of nontradable good, facing a constant
















is the relative price of each variety with respect to the aggregate price index PH
t ; yh
i;t is
demand for output produced by ￿rm i and Y H
t is aggregate demand for nontradables.
Staggered price setting ￿ la Calvo (1983) is assumed. At each point in time, a fraction (1 ￿  )
of the ￿rms receives a signal that will give them the possibility of setting new prices. Given the
optimal quantities of capital and labor, a ￿rm that resets the price at time t (and has it ￿xed for
(s-t) periods, with probability  s￿t) chooses the optimal price P￿


































where rt;s is the stochastic discount factor de￿ned as rt;s = ￿Et
Ucs























6Sveen and Weinke (2004) and Woodford (2005) show that, in environments with ￿rm-speci￿c capital and convex
costs of capital adjustment, the optimal price depends on the optimal factor usage and the ￿rm￿ s investment decisions.
This issue is not present in the model developed in this paper, since it is assumed that ￿rms rent capital, paying the
competitive rental price, and that they do not face any kind of capital adjustment costs.








Given the assumption of constant returns to scale and of perfectly competitive input markets, rmci;s
will be identical across ￿rms. Then the optimal choice of P￿






















Equation (25) says that the ￿rm will choose the optimal price P￿
t in order to reach a certain mark-up
of the expected discounted weighted sum of marginal revenues over marginal costs.
Typically, (25) is linearized around a non-distorted deterministic steady state with zero in￿ ation,
which yields the familiar New-Keynesian Phillips curve. The alternative is to refrain from imposing
this restriction. Speci￿cally, the approach suggested by Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b) is adopted
here. This procedure yields two dynamic equations (described in the appendix) for the weighted






In a symmetric equilibrium, ￿rms that can change their prices chose the same optimal price P￿
t :
Continuing to follow the notation of Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004b), the nontradables price index
will be given by:
(PH
t )1￿￿ =  (PH
t￿1)1￿￿ + (1 ￿  )(P￿
t )1￿￿; (27)
and hence in￿ ation ￿H
t in the nontradables sector is given by:
1 =  (￿H
t )￿1+￿ + (1 ￿  )(e Pt)1￿￿; (28)






Market clearing requires that total supply of nontradable goods will be either consumed (CH
t ),
10invested (invt), or purchased by the government (gt): Integrating over all ￿rms:
F(Kt;Nt) = (CH


































where st dynamics is given by:
st = (1 ￿  )(e Pt)￿￿ +  (￿H
t )￿st￿1: (31)
2.4 Monetary Policy: In￿ ation Targeting
The Monetary Authority has an explicit target for CPI in￿ ation, which in turn is given by the
weighted sum of the change in the nominal exchange rate and nontradables in￿ ation (in logs):
￿t = ￿"t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿H
t : (32)
The nominal interest rate it is the policy instrument, and is managed according to the following

















where y is the non-stochastic stationary value of total output, i is the non stochastic stationary value
of the nominal interest rate, and ￿￿ is the target for CPI in￿ ation.7
The in￿ ation target is equal to steady state in￿ ation. For this assumption to be compatible with
the existence of a stationary level of real money balances, it follows that money supply MS must be
7Some authors model in￿ ation targeting as a policy that delivers an in￿ ation rate equal to the target at all points
in time. Here, in￿ ation targeting is interpreted as a monetary regime in which there is an explicit numeric target for
in￿ ation, and actual in￿ ation is, on average, equal to the target.
11increasing at a rate equal to the in￿ ation rate. In equilibrium, money supply equals money demand
￿
MS = MD = M
￿












= ￿ = (1 + ￿￿)
1
4 (34)
2.5 Fiscal Policy: A Public Debt Target
The Government ￿ ow budget constraint is:
Mt ￿ Mt￿1 + Bt + StDg + Tt ￿ PH







gt = government expenditure on nontradable goods;
Bt = risk-free nominal one period domestic government bonds;
Dg = Government foreign debt, measured in units of the tradable good;
Tt = ￿t(WtNt + QtKt) = nominal tax revenues.
The ￿ ow constraint says that public debt maturing at time t have to monetized (Mt ￿ Mt￿1);






Pt = tt; mt = Mt
Pt ;
bt = Bt
Pt ; and use the de￿nition (7) of the real exchange rate et and of the price index (4). The real




+ bt + e1￿￿





























Let h be real end of period government liabilities:
ht = mt + bt + e1￿￿
t Dg: (38)










where Rt;T is the expected stochastic discount factor.
The Government purchases exclusively nontradable goods. Real nontradable goods purchases,
gt, measured in log-deviations from their stationary level, follows a stochastic process given by:8








Given gt, the Fiscal Authority sets the tax rate ￿ in order to generate a primary surplus so that
the real stock of Government liabilities h will remain in the neighborhood of the target h￿, according
to the rule:




= ￿0 + ￿1 (ht￿1 ￿ h￿); (41)
where ￿0 denotes the real primary surplus observed at the non-stochastic steady state.
2.6 Aggregate Resource Constraint
The aggregate resource constraint concludes the description of the model. The households (12)
and Government ￿ ow budget constraints (36) are combined and yield an expression for the current
account, where D is the total stock of foreign liabilities:
Dt ￿ Dt￿1 = CT;t ￿ Y T + iF
t￿1Dt￿1: (42)
2.7 Equilibrium
Given the households initial stock of assets, the initial price dispersion distortion, the tradable
endowment, and the stochastic processes f￿;gg; an (imperfectly) competitive equilibrium is an
allocation
￿
N; CH; CT; M; Dp; B; K
￿




, and a Govern-
8Like in the case of investment, government purchases g is an aggregate index of di⁄erent varieties of nontradable
goods.
13ment policy fi;￿;￿￿;h￿g such that:
(1) Households maximize utility subject to constraints, (5), (6), (10), (12), the initial asset
position and the No-ponzi game condition.
(2) Firms maximize pro￿ts.
(3) Markets Clear:
(i) Nontradable goods market: Y H = g + CH + inv
(ii) Labor market: NS = ND
(iii) Money market: MS = MD
(iv) Domestic bonds market: BS = BD
(v) Foreign loans market: DS = DD
(by Walras Law the capital market is cleared).
(4) The Government No Ponzi condition is satis￿ed.
3 Calibration
Parameters were calibrated in order to match characteristics of the Brazilian economy. The time
unit is a quarter and steady state ratios re￿ ect, approximately, average values observed in Brazil in
the period 1995-2004. Quarterly data was used to estimate the processes of the exogenous shocks.













Preferences and technology parameters are in a range consistent with empirical ￿ndings. Table (2)
summarizes the calibration.
[Table (2) here]
Data on the Brazilian JP Morgan EMBI spread was used as a measure of the left hand side of












The threshold D￿ is the average level of net foreign liabilities between 1995 and 2004. The interest
rate spread between US corporate investment grade and ￿junk￿bonds was used as a proxy for the
risk premium ￿t, consistent with the interpretation that this variable captures exogenous changes
in international liquidity and risk aversion. The parameters ￿1 and ￿2 were calibrated in order to
match the mean and the variance of the variables in (44).
The next step was to estimate the AR(1) process that describes the dynamics of the risk premium
￿t, according to (19). The estimated autoregressive coe¢ cient ￿￿ is 0.92 and the residual of the
regression has a standard deviation of 0.006.
The estimation of the autoregressive process (40) that characterizes Government expenditures
on goods was based on constant prices, seasonally adjusted, 4 quarters moving average of quarterly
data on expenditures (excluding interest payments) of the overall public sector as a share of output.
A dummy was included in the regression in order to capture the e⁄ect of the political cycle. The
estimated coe¢ cient of lagged government expenditures ￿g is 0.56 and the standard deviation of the
estimated residual is 0.014.
4 Dynamic Responses
The model is solved numerically, based on a second order approximation of the equilibrium conditions
of the model around the (log) of steady state values, using the method developed by Schmitt-GrohØ
and Uribe (2004a). The system of equations used when solving the model is detailed in the appendix.
The parameter ￿￿ was allowed to vary in the range [1:05 ; 5] , ￿y in the range [0 ;1:05], both
with increments equal to 0.05. The parameter range for the response of the primary surplus target to
￿ uctuations in government liabilities, ￿1; is given by the interval [0:05 ; 1], once again with increments
equal to 0.05.9
9In order to investigate the possibility that an even lower degree of volatility of in￿ ation around the target is
15The coe¢ cient of deviations of in￿ ation from the target in the monetary policy rule is strictly
larger than 1, whereas the coe¢ cient ￿1 in the ￿scal rule is strictly larger than zero. Interest lies,
therefore, on a ￿scal-monetary regime in which the ￿scal and in￿ ation targets are attainable and
where monetary policy pins down the equilibrium path of prices. Using Leeper (1991) terminology,
the search for welfare maximizing parameters will focus on a class of ￿scal-monetary regime char-
acterized by passive ￿scal policy and active monetary policy. The corresponding policy rules and
policy parameter ranges yield, in most cases, a determinate equilibrium.10
Figures (1) and (2) in the appendix display impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock
to government spending on goods and to the risk premium. These impulse responses were generated
after solving the model under two di⁄erent scenarios:
(1) The monetary and the ￿scal authorities target CPI in￿ ation and public debt, respectively,
according to rules (33) and (41). The policy rule parameters are those that maximize welfare11,
given the parameter range previously described. Speci￿cally, ￿￿ = 2:15; ￿y = 0:55; ￿1 = 1:
(2) In the alternative scenario, instead of targeting CPI in￿ ation, the Monetary Authority targets
domestic (nontradables) in￿ ation. In order to accomplish this, nontradables in￿ ation replaces CPI
in￿ ation in the policy rule (33). The impulse responses illustrate the dynamics with optimal policy
parameters ￿￿ = 3:35; ￿y = 1 and ￿1 = 0:35:
4.0.1 The E⁄ect of a Government Spending Shock
Figure (1) in the appendix illustrates the e⁄ect of a government spending shock. The increase in
demand raises nontradables production and puts upward pressure on marginal costs.
Producers have then the incentive to raise their prices. Nontradables in￿ ation increases, which
triggers monetary policy tightening under CPI targeting. Consistent with uncovered interest rate
parity, the nominal exchange rate appreciates on impact, and then depreciates henceforth. The initial
optimal, the welfare consequences of ￿￿ ￿ [5;15] (with increments = 0.5) were also considered.
10Ascari and Rotele (2005) show that equilibrium determinacy is a⁄ected by the presence of trend in￿ ation, or the
fact that in￿ ation is larger than zero in the long run. This feature enlarges the indeterminacy region in the parameter
space. For example, with two percent trend in￿ ation, they ￿nd that the determinacy region lies (roughly) below a 45




= (1;0): A similar result is found in this paper, since trend in￿ ation is also present
in the environment considered here.
11See discussion in the next session.
16appreciation of the nominal exchange rate causes a decline in the price of tradable goods, measured
in domestic currency. Therefore, the overall increase in the CPI index is not as large as it would have
been, in the absence monetary policy tightening and the corresponding exchange rate movement.
The appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, coupled with higher nontradables in￿ ation result
in an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This, in turn, triggers an expenditure switching e⁄ect,
and households consume less nontradable goods and more tradable goods. The result is a temporary
current account de￿cit and increase in net foreign liabilities.
The tightening of monetary policy also results in a temporary increase in government debt h, due
to higher interest rate payments on debt. The tax rate is increased in order to generate enough tax
revenues to compensate for increased government spending on goods, and also because the relative
price of goods purchased by the government increased (due to the real exchange rate appreciation).
Tax rates also have to be raised so that the Fiscal Authority starts paying o⁄ higher interest rate
expenses.
The dynamics is similar when the Monetary Authority targets nontradables in￿ ation (dotted
lines in the impulse responses). In this case, monetary policy tightening engineers an increase in the
expected real interest rate that is large enough to reduce households￿nontradables consumption, to
a point such that the tendency of marginal costs of production to increase is signi￿cantly reduced.
The combination of loose government spending and tight monetary policy implies that government
spending crowds out private nontradables consumption.
4.0.2 The E⁄ect of a Risk Premium Shock
Figure (2) in the appendix illustrates the e⁄ect of risk premium shock. The increase in the cost of
foreign funding prompts a temporary reduction in net external debt. This is achieved with a reduction
in overall consumption, combined with expenditure switching away from tradable goods. In turn,
potentially higher demand for nontradable goods provides incentive for nontradable producers to
raise their prices. Monetary policy is tightened and the increase in the real interest rate results in a
reduction in consumption.
Nontradables in￿ ation rises and then decreases gradually, while the nominal exchange rate de-
17preciates (once again, consistent with the uncovered interest rate parity condition). This results in
a gradual depreciation of the real exchange rate, which, combined with lower overall consumption,
is conducive to a decline of net foreign liabilities.
Because the depreciation of the exchange rate leads to a temporary expansion of nontradables
output, the tax base increases and initially the Fiscal Authority can reach its primary surplus ob-
jective with a lower tax rate. However, the cost of servicing public debt increases over time due to
higher real interest rates and the primary surplus has to be revised upwards, leading to an increase
in tax rates.
The dynamics is similar under a policy of nontradables in￿ ation targeting. The di⁄erence now
is that in order to keep nontradables in￿ ation close to the target, the Monetary Authority has to
engineer a larger reduction in consumption, so that nontradables consumption does not increase




Welfare is the present discounted value of expected lifetime utility, conditional on the state variables
of the economy being at the stationary steady state at time zero.12 The welfare loss is the percentage
of consumption under the optimal policy that the household would be willing to give up, in order to
be indi⁄erent between the optimal policy and the alternative policy. (The appendix provides details
of the computation).
Once the model is solved for all the possible parameter combinations, attention is restricted to the
set of policy parameter combinations that yield a determinate equilibrium and also that correspond
to a stochastic equilibrium such that the unconditional means of state variables do not deviate
12The use of the conditional welfare measure is advocated by Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004a) and by Kim, Kim,
Schaumburg and Sims (2003).




￿ < 0:01; (45)
where EXt is the vector of unconditional means of the state variables of the model and X the vector
of nonstochastic steady state values of these variables. The motivation for imposing such restriction
is that some policy parameter combinations result in unconditional means that deviate from their
nonstochastic steady state value by an amount that renders the second-order approximation around
the stationary value very imprecise. Kollman (2006) also detects this problem and imposes a similar
restriction.
5.2 Main Findings
The main conclusions can be summarized as follows:
(i) A strong anti-in￿ ation stance is optimal, even though complete in￿ ation stabilization is not.
(ii) Should policymakers target a domestic in￿ ation index, as opposed to CPI, there would be
large welfare gains.
(iii) Despite the intertemporal distortions imposed by time varying taxes, the model favors fast
￿scal adjustments, with the optimal responsiveness of the primary surplus to debt deviations from
target ranging from 0.35 to 1, depending on the speci￿c in￿ ation index being targeted.
These results are reported in Table (3), which shows the volatility of selected variables, the
optimal policy and the welfare loss associated to alternative policies:
(a) CPI targeting - Line (A) in Table (3) reports parameters that maximize welfare in the
baseline case of CPI in￿ ation and public liabilities targeting. The policy mix delivers small volatility
of CPI in￿ ation and of public debt around their respective targets. Welfare maximizing monetary





: The primary surplus responsiveness to increases in public debt
is high, with the optimal parameter ￿1 = 1 being at the upper bound of the parameter range
investigated.
(b) CPI targeting with a sluggish ￿scal response - It would be interesting to investigate
the welfare loss associated to a ￿scal rule that features a sluggish response of the primary surplus to
deviations of public debt with respect to the liabilities target. Welfare implications are reported in
line (B) in Table (3). The monetary policy rule parameters remain the same
￿
￿￿ = 2:15;￿y = 0:55
￿
but now ￿1 = 0:05 is imposed. The volatility of public debt becomes signi￿cantly higher, but the
welfare loss is small (compared to the case of optimal CPI targeting with fast ￿scal adjustment).
One of the reasons is that the policy that prescribes a slow ￿scal adjustment delivers a very similar
level of tax rate volatility. The intuition is that, as the adjustment gets postponed, the size of the
￿scal imbalance gets larger, hence higher tax rate adjustments are required in the future.
(c) Complete stabilization of domestic (nontradables) in￿ ation - Next, the welfare con-
sequences of a policy that completely stabilizes nontradables in￿ ation at its nonstochastic level is
investigated. The literature on optimal monetary policy in open economies has shown that this
policy yields superior welfare compared to CPI targeting. The rationale is that with CPI in￿ ation
targeting, the nominal exchange rate ￿ uctuation is being implicitly targeted, especially if the degree
of pass through from the exchange rate to prices is large. In the case of emerging markets, even when
the degree of pass-through is low, the impact of the exchange rate on tradable prices is large, because
of the large magnitude of exchange rate ￿ uctuations.13 The problem is that exchange rate is only
indirectly related to the primary source of ine¢ ciency in the economy, which is price dispersion in
the sector that faces nominal price rigidities. Therefore, a policy that directly addresses this problem
- by eliminating or reducing the incentive of producers to change prices - can potentially improve
welfare.
13For instance, Freitas, Goldfajn, Minella and Muinhos (2003:1035) document that in Brazil, ￿the in￿ ationary
pressures resulting from exchange rate depreciation are more related to the magnitude of the depreciation than to the
pass-through coe¢ cient￿ .
20It is interesting to examine if this conclusion carries through to an environment with distortionary
taxes and with a simultaneous ￿scal target. The procedure was to use domestic in￿ ation instead
of CPI in the monetary policy rule. The parameter ￿￿ was set arbitrarily large, in order to ensure
a complete stabilization of nontradables in￿ ation at ￿￿. The remaining policy parameters are left
unconstrained.
Line (C) in Table (3) shows that a policy that eliminates nontradables in￿ ation volatility delivers
a higher level of welfare compared to CPI targeting. Optimal policy features a fast ￿scal adjustment
(￿1 = 1): In this case, the response to output ￿ uctuations ￿y is immaterial for welfare (results
reported corresponding to the case ￿y = 0).
(d) Domestic In￿ ation Targeting - Line (D) reports welfare under the overall optimal policy,
namely public liabilities and domestic (nontradables) in￿ ation targeting, this time without imposing
the restriction that nontradables in￿ ation will be fully stabilized (hence the parameter ￿￿ is ￿nite
and belongs to the range previously speci￿ed).
This is a case of interest because the nonstochastic in￿ ation level does not necessarily deliver
an e¢ cient allocation. Therefore, a policy of keeping nontradables in￿ ation constant at that level
might not be optimal. This suspicion is con￿rmed by results in line (D) in Table (3). There is an
additional welfare gain when domestic in￿ ation is targeted as opposed to CPI, this time allowing for
some (small) volatility of nontradables in￿ ation around its non-stochastic level.
Optimal policy features a quite active response to output ￿ uctuations (￿y = 1) and a somewhat
more sluggish responsiveness of the primary surplus to deviations of public debt with respect to the
target (￿1 = 0:35): This result was partially driven by constraint (45). This is the only case in which
this constraint binds, ruling out parameter combinations that yield an even higher level of welfare.
In fact, given ￿￿, welfare tends to be higher with a smaller ￿y (zero, in most cases) and with a larger
￿scal response ￿1 = 1: However, with this parameter con￿guration the deviation of the capital stock
unconditional mean with respect to its nonstochastic level is larger than one percent.
(e) Fixed exchange rate regime - Finally, line (E) in Table (3) reports the welfare loss
21associated to a ￿xed exchange rate regime, which is accomplished by a monetary policy rule that is
designed to eliminate nominal exchange rate ￿ uctuations. Nominal exchange rate changes replace
the in￿ ation index in the monetary policy rule and the response of the interest rate to exchange rate
￿ uctuations, ￿er is set arbitrarily large. This policy implies a large welfare loss.
[Table (3) here]
5.3 Discussion of Welfare Results
A useful way to interpret these results is to think about how agents in this incomplete markets,
bonds-only economy react to risk. Precautionary savings imply that it is optimal to reduce the
level of foreign borrowing, especially taking into account that the nonstochastic level of foreign debt
is not e¢ cient (remember that with an upward sloping supply of funds, each individual agent￿ s
borrowing decisions in￿ uence the cost of external borrowing faced by the economy, generating a
negative externality).
This is why, in all policy regimes considered here, the unconditional mean of net foreign assets
will be lower than its stationary nonstochastic level. This can be seen in Table (4), which reports
the percentage deviation of the unconditional means of some key variables with respect to their
nonstochastic steady state level.
[Table (4) here]
Table (4) shows that the decline in the foreign debt position is smaller, the larger is the weight of
exchange ￿ uctuations in the monetary policy rule. The reason is that policies that implicitly target
the nominal exchange rate - at the extreme, a ￿xed exchange rate regime - minimize the volatility
of the cost of external borrowing, and end up promoting an ine¢ ciently high level of external debt.
Moreover, they do not address directly one of the main distortions in the model, namely the price
dispersion in the nontradables sector.
A policy of targeting domestic nontradables in￿ ation is optimal because it addresses these two
sources of ine¢ ciency simultaneously. Since it does not target exchange rate movements, this policy
does not interfere with ￿ uctuations in the cost of borrowing from abroad in foreign currency. In light
22of that, agents adjust accordingly, reducing their debt exposure down to an e¢ cient level. At the
same time, by reducing the volatility of in￿ ation in the nontradables sector, this policy is mitigating
the output loss associated to price dispersion in this sector.
There is a third channel that reinforces the optimality of a policy of domestic in￿ ation targeting.
The reduction in foreign debt exposure comes from a combination of higher savings and expenditure
switching away from tradable goods. This boosts domestic capital accumulation and nontradables
output, increasing the tax base. As a consequence, the unconditional mean tax rate will be lower
than its stationary level, as can be seen in Table (4).
This provides some intuition for why the model delivers the result that fast ￿scal adjustments
are optimal. With fast ￿scal adjustments, the increase in savings fund capital accumulation and not
additional government borrowing. The positive impact on the tax base makes room for a reduction of
tax rates. Therefore, even though a fast ￿scal adjustment increases the intertemporal tax distortion,
it is conducive to a reduction of the level of taxes and hence to a decrease of the intratemporal tax
distortion in the stochastic equilibrium.
6 Conclusions
This paper identi￿es welfare maximizing policy rules when there are explicit numeric targets
for both the in￿ ation rate and public debt. The framework is tailored to capture essential features
of emerging markets economies, whose adoption of in￿ ation-￿scal targeting regimes was typically a
consequence of IMF conditionality. The model is calibrated using Brazilian data.
Welfare is investigated in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that
describes a small open economy with capital accumulation, distortionary taxation and nominal price
rigidities. The model is solved using a second-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions,
and optimal policy parameters are identi￿ed.
The paper shows that previous ￿ndings in the literature on optimal policy rules - in particular,
that a strong anti-in￿ ation stance is optimal, in the presence of price rigidities - continue to hold in a
23more general environment. Speci￿cally, low in￿ ation volatility is still a feature of optimal policy in an
open economy, after accounting for the e⁄ect of distortionary taxation and for the coexistence of ￿scal
and in￿ ation targets. Moreover, despite intertemporal distortions triggered by ￿scal adjustments,
￿scal discipline (in the form of low public debt volatility around its target) is optimal due to its
welfare improving, long term e⁄ects on tax rates.
These are important ￿ndings, in light of the ￿scal constraints that are typical of emerging market
economies, namely a large stock of short term debt and a corresponding spillover from short term
interest rate management to the cost of servicing public debt. Speci￿cally, negative implications of
restrictive monetary policy to the ￿scal accounts are frequently identi￿ed as a reason why monetary
policy should be less restrictive. In the context of in￿ ation targeting, it is argued that the Monetary
Authority should tolerate deviations of in￿ ation from the target, as a way to avoid higher interest
rates and the corresponding increase of the cost of outstanding debt. This paper shows that this
strategy can have large negative implications for welfare, and that the policy debate should rather be
focused on which in￿ ation index to target, given that the strategy currently pursued - CPI targeting
- is not optimal.
7 Appendix
7.1 Welfare Measure
Welfare is the conditional expectation of discounted lifetime utility of the representative agent (con-
ditional on the economy being at the non-stochastic steady state at time zero). Let Wopt be the












Let Wsub be the lower level of welfare associated to a di⁄erent, suboptimal policy. The measure of
the welfare loss is the percentage ￿ of consumption under the optimal policy that the representative
agent would have to give up in order to be indi⁄erent between a policy that delivers Wopt and a


























































Wsub = (1 ￿ ￿)



























Let yt be the vector of endogenous variables and zt = [z1
t z2
t] be the vector of predetermined
variables at time t, with z1
t being the vector of endogenous state variables and z2
t the vector of
exogenous state variables. In the context of the present model, yt = [ ￿H
t "t ct ii nt x1;t ￿t]; z1
t
= [kt￿1 et￿1 st￿1 dt￿1 ct￿1 it￿1 bt￿1] and ￿nally z2
t = [gt ￿t]: The remaining variables of the
model can be expressed as function of yt and zt; using (6), (10), (18), (23), (24), (26), (28), (30), the
de￿nition of CPI in￿ ation (32), the primary surplus rule (41) and the aggregate resource constraint
(42).
The model comprises a set of equilibrium conditions that can be written in the general format
25Et f (yt+1;yt;zt+1;zt) = 0;















Uncovered interest rate parity:
1 + it = Et(1 + iF










Ine¢ ciency due to price dispersion:
st = (1 ￿  )e p
￿￿
t +  (￿H
t )￿st￿1:
Dynamic equation for the present discounted value of marginal costs:
x1 = (e p
￿1￿￿
t )Y H







26Dynamic equation for the present discounted value of revenues:
x2 = (e p
￿￿
t )Y H











+ bt + e1￿￿









































Country risk premium process:
￿t = ￿￿ ￿ ￿t￿1 + "￿;t :
Government spending process:
gt = ￿g ￿ gt￿1 + "g;t :













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿ = 0:1 CIA parameter
￿ = 2 intertemporal elasticity of substitution = (1=￿)
’ = 3 elasticity of labor supply = (1=’)
  = 0:75 probability of adjusting price at time t = 0:25
￿ = 1:1 average mark-up over marginal cost
￿ = 0:4 capital share in GDP
￿ = 0:05 depreciation
￿ = 0:5 tradables share in consumption
￿ = 0:9765 subjective discount factor
￿￿ = 0:06 target for annual in￿ ation: 6%
￿1 = 0:40 elasticity of interest rate on foreign loans with respect to risk premium ￿
￿2 = 0:33 elasticity of interest rate on foreign loans with respect to (D=D￿)
Exogenous State Variables - Autoregressive Parameters
￿g = 0:56 autoregressive coe¢ cient of Government spending
￿￿ = 0:92 autoregressive coe¢ cient of risk premium
Shocks - Standard Deviations
￿"g = 0:014 standard deviation of government spending shock
￿"￿ = 0:006 standard deviation of risk premium shock
Steady State Ratios
h￿
y = 0:53 public debt to total output ratio
tax
GDP = 0:15 tax revenues to total output ratio
￿0
y = 0:013 primary ￿scal balance to total output ratio
b
y = 0:39 government domestic debt to total output ratio
DG
y = 0:10 government external debt to total output ratio
D
y = 0:25 economy￿ s external debt to total output ratio
Y
H
GDP = 0:61 nontradables output to total output ratio
g
Y
H = 0:22 government spending on goods to nontradables output ratio




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Nominal Exchange Rate Depreciation









































Figure 1: Impulse response to a one standard deviation shock to government spending. Solid line:
CPI in￿ ation targeting. Dotted line: Domestic (nontradables) in￿ ation targeting.

























Nominal Exchange Rate Depreciation









































Figure 2: Impulse response to a one standard deviation shock to risk premium. Solid line: CPI
in￿ ation targeting. Dotted line: Domestic (nontradables) in￿ ation targeting.
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